The Supreme Court’s analysis in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) has been cited favorably again, this time with regard to a Due Process challenge to a federal statute. On February 18, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit vacated the denial of a motion for a preliminary injunction brought by a plaintiff challenging the constitutionality of a federal law regulating online sales of tobacco products, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Gordon v. Holder, 2011 WL559002 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 18, 2011). Previewing the issues to be addressed by the District Court on remand, the Court of Appeals cited Quill as “instructive” in analyzing the plaintiff’s claim that the federal statute violates the Due Process Clause.
In a statement likely to send shivers up the spines of the members of the Governing Board of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement and other advocates for federal legislation to override Quill’s “physical presence” requirement arising under the Commerce Clause, the D.C. Circuit commented that “there remains an open question whether a national authorization of disparate state levies on e-commerce renders concerns about presence and burden obsolete” as a matter of Due Process. Id. at *4 (emphasis added). While this statement, and the Court’s opinion, does not alter the analysis under Quill of the constitutionality of state tax (and tax-related) laws under the Commerce Clause, it suggests that the concerns about “presence and burden” presented in Quill are potentially also relevant to determining whether a federal law authorizing state tax levies is consistent with the Due Process Clause.
Proponents of federal legislation to allow states to impose sales and use tax collection obligations on Internet retailers and other remote sellers without regard to the sellers’ nexus have long–assumed that the “dormant” Commerce Clause is the only obstacle to such a scheme, and that this obstacle is one which could be swept away by Congress. But, the D.C. Circuit’s statement in Gordon signals that such a law may also face a meaningful challenge under the Due Process Clause, violations of which Congress cannot approve. Citing Quill and International Shoe, the D.C. Circuit notes that “Even national legislation—which can permissibly sanction burdens on interstate commerce—cannot violate the Due Process principles of “fair play and substantial justice.”
The “open question” identified by the Court may mean that genuine simplification of state sales and use tax systems will be a constitutional prerequisite to a national mandate of compliance with such systems, to ensure that basic Due Process requirements have been satisfied. The D.C. Circuit, at least, perceives “disparate” state tax obligations as potentially at odds with fundamental due process.
Wednesday, February 23, 2011
Saturday, February 19, 2011
Does Unconscionability Theory Lead to Greater Economic Problems?
Today is the second day of the International Contracts Conference hosted this year by Stetson University College of Law. Professor Xi George Zhou of the University of Sheffield presented his paper, An Economic Perspective on Legal Remedies for Unconscionable Contracts, where he argues that there are disincentives to trade created by unconscionability doctrine, precaution problems and potential abuse of rights. His paper asks whether a higher deterrence model leads to greater economic problems. He proposes that creating an effective remedy for unconscionable behavior may require a legal remedy that is lower, as a high sanction may result in less economic transactions due to precautions employed by traders. Thus, it is impossible to eliminate bad behavior through deterrence alone. In order to use any legal mechanism we need to focus on the effectiveness of the tactic. There are risks to all deterrence models.
Professor Zhou also presented a call for papers for the Society of Legal Scholars Conference September 5-8. This year's topic is Law in Politics, Politics in Law. All papers on any aspect of contract, commercial and consumer law are welcome, whether on topic or not. Paper proposals are due by March 4, 2011 to Professor Zhou at qi.zhou@sheffield.ac.uk.
Professor Zhou also presented a call for papers for the Society of Legal Scholars Conference September 5-8. This year's topic is Law in Politics, Politics in Law. All papers on any aspect of contract, commercial and consumer law are welcome, whether on topic or not. Paper proposals are due by March 4, 2011 to Professor Zhou at qi.zhou@sheffield.ac.uk.
-jsm
Friday, February 18, 2011
Card Networks Attempting to Block Debit Card Merchant Fee Regulation
In a surprise late addition to the financial reform legislation, Congress required the Federal Reserve to regulate the fees that merchants pay to accept debit cards. The statute requires the regulated rate to include only per transaction costs and certain anti-fraud expenses. In December, the FED put out for comment a proposed rate of 12 cents per transaction, nearly 75% below the current average fee of 44 cents. Current rates are based on a percentage of the sale price.
Merchants were pleased with the FED's proposal. Banks were not, claiming that a fee that low would force them to lose money on debit card programs unless they charged their own customers. (Imagine that.) One bank has filed a constitutional challenge to the legislation, arguing that it constitutes a taking of bank property without just compensation and violates the equal protection clause because only the largest banks will have their rates regulated. The period for comment ends next Tuesday, February 22, and the FED must promulgate a final rate by April 21.
In recent testimony before the House Financial Services Committee, FED Governor Sarah Bloom Raskin explained that board members were "reserving judgment on the final rule" until they can consider all of the comments. Some lawmakers have expressed concern the FED has not adequately considered the cost of fraud prevention. Visa has ramped up a vigorous lobbying campaign, urging Congress to enact new legislation delaying the implementation of the regulation. Observers believe that changes at this point are unlikely. Representative Barney Frank, however, told the press that while he would not support the delay that Visa has requested, he would support instructing the FED to include more factors in the fee calculation.
Wednesday, February 16, 2011
Arbitration Clauses, Class Actions and State Tax
What a funny combination of terms. You might be asking what state tax has to do with arbitration and class action suits. Two recent court decisions illustrate the connection.
In particular, a “bad day” for a corporate executive is receiving the complaint and summons for a class action lawsuit. While there have been fewer class action lawsuits in connection with state taxes than there have been in other areas of the law, the plaintiff’s bar has looked at state tax as a development opportunity and has commenced suits for inappropriate collection of state taxes. The basis commonly used for such a suit is that the state’s unfair and deceptive trade practices statute is violated by the collection of sales tax if such tax is not due. For example, a company might be collecting tax on food in a state in which food is not taxable. A better example would be collecting tax on Internet access, which is prohibited under a federal statute, the Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151n (1998) (“ITFA”), as amended, unless a state is grandfathered.
AT&T found out the hard way about class action lawsuits in the state tax area. It was collecting tax on Internet access services. Under the ITFA, it was prohibited from collecting such tax in all but a few states. Thus, as I wrote in my blog post of September 17, 2010, AT&T was slammed with a class action lawsuit, and settled for payment of millions of dollars of attorneys’ fees and other costs.
AT&T also recently discovered that there is a way to preclude such class action suits, at least in Texas. In particular, AT&T provided in its agreements with customers that the exclusive basis for resolving all disputes relating to its service was arbitration. When a class action lawsuit was brought against AT&T by Texas consumers for collecting tax on Internet access charges less than $25.00 (Texas, a grandfathered state, imposes tax only on Internet access charges in excess of $25.00 per month), AT&T filed a motion to dismiss the suit based on the arbitration clause in its agreement. Construing the clause broadly, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas ruled in the case of Stephen T. Johnson v. AT&T Mobility, LLC (12/21/2010), that the clause should be read to include disputes regarding the collection of sales and use tax. Thus, the court dismissed the class action lawsuit and stated that each customer would be required to bring its own dispute in arbitration. If such decision is sustained on appeal, it will significantly limit AT&T’s exposure.
Whether an arbitration clause will in all instances require potential plaintiffs to present their claims in private arbitration rather than public litigation will depend upon a number of factors, but any company doing business with consumers should consider the use of arbitration clauses as a means to resolve disputes. This, of course, is particularly appropriate in the case of a telecom company, but it can be used for Internet retailers and other direct marketers, as well.
In particular, a “bad day” for a corporate executive is receiving the complaint and summons for a class action lawsuit. While there have been fewer class action lawsuits in connection with state taxes than there have been in other areas of the law, the plaintiff’s bar has looked at state tax as a development opportunity and has commenced suits for inappropriate collection of state taxes. The basis commonly used for such a suit is that the state’s unfair and deceptive trade practices statute is violated by the collection of sales tax if such tax is not due. For example, a company might be collecting tax on food in a state in which food is not taxable. A better example would be collecting tax on Internet access, which is prohibited under a federal statute, the Internet Tax Freedom Act, 47 U.S.C. § 151n (1998) (“ITFA”), as amended, unless a state is grandfathered.
AT&T found out the hard way about class action lawsuits in the state tax area. It was collecting tax on Internet access services. Under the ITFA, it was prohibited from collecting such tax in all but a few states. Thus, as I wrote in my blog post of September 17, 2010, AT&T was slammed with a class action lawsuit, and settled for payment of millions of dollars of attorneys’ fees and other costs.
AT&T also recently discovered that there is a way to preclude such class action suits, at least in Texas. In particular, AT&T provided in its agreements with customers that the exclusive basis for resolving all disputes relating to its service was arbitration. When a class action lawsuit was brought against AT&T by Texas consumers for collecting tax on Internet access charges less than $25.00 (Texas, a grandfathered state, imposes tax only on Internet access charges in excess of $25.00 per month), AT&T filed a motion to dismiss the suit based on the arbitration clause in its agreement. Construing the clause broadly, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas ruled in the case of Stephen T. Johnson v. AT&T Mobility, LLC (12/21/2010), that the clause should be read to include disputes regarding the collection of sales and use tax. Thus, the court dismissed the class action lawsuit and stated that each customer would be required to bring its own dispute in arbitration. If such decision is sustained on appeal, it will significantly limit AT&T’s exposure.
Whether an arbitration clause will in all instances require potential plaintiffs to present their claims in private arbitration rather than public litigation will depend upon a number of factors, but any company doing business with consumers should consider the use of arbitration clauses as a means to resolve disputes. This, of course, is particularly appropriate in the case of a telecom company, but it can be used for Internet retailers and other direct marketers, as well.
2011 Sales Survey
I just put the draft of the Sales Survey up on SSRN. It will appear in the Business Lawyer in August or September, but there are some really great cases this year. Yes, some really good examination ideas as well!
- JSM
Suffolk Law Visiting Position
Suffolk University School of Law is seeking potential visiting professors (assistant, associate, or full) to teach a 6 credit-hour Contracts course beginning Fall 2011. Candidates should have significant teaching experience and strong student evaluations. Suffolk University is conveniently located in the center of Boston. If anyone is interested, please feel free to contact Elizabeth Trujillo, Associate Professor, Suffolk University Law School, 120 Tremont Street, Boston, MA 02108-4977 Tel: 617-305-1672; etrujillo@suffolk.edu.
- JSM
Tuesday, February 15, 2011
Specific Performance, Parol Evidence and the Naughty Monkey
Here is a great case about specific performance, parol evidence and a yacht named the "Naughty Monkey!"U.C.C. section 2-716 provides a more liberal attitude toward the remedy of specific performance of contracts for the sale of goods than the common law traditionally does, and a concomitant broader view about when the goods are unique. In Naughty Monkey LLC v. Marinemax Northeast LLC, No. C.A. 5095-VCN, 2010 WL 5545409 (Del. Ch. Dec. 23, 2010, the court considered a request for specific performance based on language in a yacht sales contract providing “TRADE VALUE GUARANTEED TO 15% LOSS WITHIN 18 MONTHS (PER ANDREW SCHNEIDER) SUBJ. TO MARINE SURVEY AND FINANCING” (the “Buyer Protection Clause”). Michael Stock (“Stock”) contacted Marinemax Northeast LLC (“Marinemax”) about the purchase of a new boat after seeing their boats at the National Harbor Boat Show. Eventually, Stock purchased a 62-foot Azimut yacht, which he named the Naughty Monkey, for $1,825,000 through an entity he named the Naughty Monkey LLC (“Naughty Monkey”). Concerned about losses on a yacht of this price, Stock negotiated some down side price protection in the form of the Buyer Protection Clause. About a year later, Stock decided that he did not want the Naughty Monkey and proposed that he trade the boat back to Marinemax for a boat for $2900 and Marinemax would make a cash payment to him for $1,633.350, the difference under the contract. Marinemax refused this request, taking the position that the agreement only allowed Stock to trade the Naughty Monkey in toward the purchase of a more expensive yacht. Stock brought suit for specific performance on the contract, as well as damages related to financing, insurance and maintenance costs for the yacht.
The first issue the court considered was the meaning of the Buyer Protection Clause. Without any reference to section 2-202, the court instead initially referenced certain traditional notions of interpretation, namely to “effect to the clear terms of agreements, regardless of the intent of the parties at the time of contract formation” and to use the “customary, ordinary and accepted meaning of the language.” Nevertheless, the court considered extrinsic evidence to select a meaning of the Buyer Protection Clause that neither party argued: that Stock could trade in the Naughty Monkey to Marinemax, but not for cash, toward the purchase of any merchandise, not only boats of higher value.
Turning to the issue of specific performance under section 2-716, the court ruled that a “remedy at law would do complete injustice in this case.” The court observed that having Marinemax pay monetary damages would inevitably deprive it of the benefit of the bargain which would permit it to sell Stock another yacht at retail cost which it only paid wholesale. Similarly, if the court were to give Stock monetary relief then he would get a liquid asset, which is more than he would have received under the agreement. Accordingly, specific performance, was the appropriate remedy.
- JSM
Monday, February 14, 2011
Maine Introduces Modified, Colorado-Style Notice and Reporting Law, Which Also Likely Violates The Commerce Clause
On February 9, 2011, the Maine Legislature introduced a bill (LD 469) which would impose upon certain out-of-state retailers a set of notice and reporting obligations that closely parallel the requirements of Colorado’s 2010 law, H.B. 10-1193. Enforcement of H.B. 10-1193 was recently enjoined by a federal judge in Denver on the grounds that such requirements are likely unconstitutional and in violation of the Commerce Clause. As we have reported in prior posts, Brann & Isaacson represents the Direct Marketing Association in the federal court challenge to the now-suspended Colorado law, after which the Maine bill is patterned.
Maine’s LD 469 includes all three of the Colorado law’s notice and reporting requirements – retailers must provide the Transactional Notice, Annual Purchase Summaries to customers, and Customer Information Reports to revenue officials – and would impose penalties on affected retailers for non-compliance with the law. Notably, however, unlike the Colorado law, the Maine bill includes no $500 annual minimum purchase threshold to trigger the requirement that an affected retailer must send a customer an Annual Purchase Summary. Similar to Colorado’s law, under LD 469 such annual summaries to customers must include, if available, “[d]escriptions of items purchased,” as well as dates and amounts. Also in contrast to Colorado, the report to Maine Revenue Services must include all of the information provided to each purchaser in the annual summary – thereby requiring that at least descriptions of the items purchased by customers of an affected out-of-state retailer be turned over to Maine Revenue Services. The Maine bill thus raises even more significant privacy concerns for Maine consumers buying from affected retailers than does the privacy-invading Colorado law.
The Maine bill also appears to differ from the Colorado law in another respect: whereas the suspended Colorado law applies, by its terms, to all out-of-state retailers that do not collect Colorado sales tax, LD 469 imposes its onerous notice and reporting obligations only upon companies that are presumed to be doing business in the state because they are members of a “controlled group of corporations” that has at least one member who is already a retailer with a physical presence in the state. The Bill Summary states that “[t]his bill requires out-of-state retailers that are not required to collect sales tax and that are part of a controlled group of corporations with a connection in the State” to comply with the notice and reporting obligations. The apparent requirement that, to be subject to the law, an out-of-state retailer must have an affiliated retailer with physical presence in Maine, means that the proposed law would not apply to as broad a group of out-of-state companies as does the Colorado law.
What the sponsors of the bill apparently fail to recognize is that limiting the notice and reporting obligations to a more narrow group of out-of-state retailers who do not collect sales tax (i.e, only those who are part of a controlled group) does not change the fact that it discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has made it perfectly clear that a state cannot pick and choose which out-of-state companies it will discriminate against – even state laws that have imposed disparate treatment upon only a single out-of-state company that is not imposed upon in-state companies are virtually per se invalid under the Commerce Clause.
The prospects for passage of LD 469 are, at this point, entirely uncertain, so there is still time for Maine’s elected officials to avoid following in the footsteps of their Colorado counterparts. In addition to running afoul of over 180 years of established constitutional law, LD 469 is simply bad policy – invading the privacy of Maine citizens should never be viewed as a proper approach to promoting use tax reporting.
Since the new year, several other states, including Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, New Mexico, South Dakota, Vermont, and Texas, have introduced new notice and reporting bills, or “Amazon” affiliate-nexus legislation. Stay tuned for an update on the progress of these bills.
Maine’s LD 469 includes all three of the Colorado law’s notice and reporting requirements – retailers must provide the Transactional Notice, Annual Purchase Summaries to customers, and Customer Information Reports to revenue officials – and would impose penalties on affected retailers for non-compliance with the law. Notably, however, unlike the Colorado law, the Maine bill includes no $500 annual minimum purchase threshold to trigger the requirement that an affected retailer must send a customer an Annual Purchase Summary. Similar to Colorado’s law, under LD 469 such annual summaries to customers must include, if available, “[d]escriptions of items purchased,” as well as dates and amounts. Also in contrast to Colorado, the report to Maine Revenue Services must include all of the information provided to each purchaser in the annual summary – thereby requiring that at least descriptions of the items purchased by customers of an affected out-of-state retailer be turned over to Maine Revenue Services. The Maine bill thus raises even more significant privacy concerns for Maine consumers buying from affected retailers than does the privacy-invading Colorado law.
The Maine bill also appears to differ from the Colorado law in another respect: whereas the suspended Colorado law applies, by its terms, to all out-of-state retailers that do not collect Colorado sales tax, LD 469 imposes its onerous notice and reporting obligations only upon companies that are presumed to be doing business in the state because they are members of a “controlled group of corporations” that has at least one member who is already a retailer with a physical presence in the state. The Bill Summary states that “[t]his bill requires out-of-state retailers that are not required to collect sales tax and that are part of a controlled group of corporations with a connection in the State” to comply with the notice and reporting obligations. The apparent requirement that, to be subject to the law, an out-of-state retailer must have an affiliated retailer with physical presence in Maine, means that the proposed law would not apply to as broad a group of out-of-state companies as does the Colorado law.
What the sponsors of the bill apparently fail to recognize is that limiting the notice and reporting obligations to a more narrow group of out-of-state retailers who do not collect sales tax (i.e, only those who are part of a controlled group) does not change the fact that it discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the Constitution. The Supreme Court has made it perfectly clear that a state cannot pick and choose which out-of-state companies it will discriminate against – even state laws that have imposed disparate treatment upon only a single out-of-state company that is not imposed upon in-state companies are virtually per se invalid under the Commerce Clause.
The prospects for passage of LD 469 are, at this point, entirely uncertain, so there is still time for Maine’s elected officials to avoid following in the footsteps of their Colorado counterparts. In addition to running afoul of over 180 years of established constitutional law, LD 469 is simply bad policy – invading the privacy of Maine citizens should never be viewed as a proper approach to promoting use tax reporting.
Since the new year, several other states, including Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, New Mexico, South Dakota, Vermont, and Texas, have introduced new notice and reporting bills, or “Amazon” affiliate-nexus legislation. Stay tuned for an update on the progress of these bills.
Thursday, February 10, 2011
Good Faith in the Termination of Sales Contracts
Courts in several cases addressed claims for breach of contract based on a party’s failure to act in good faith. So, what does good faith require under UCC section 1-304? In the following case, the court did a nice job of tying an arbitration panel's implication of a reasonability requirement in the application of a termination provision in an agreement with the obligation of good faith.
In Burton Corp. v. Shanghai Viquest Precesion Industries Co., Ltd., No. 10 Civ. 3163(DLC), 2010 WL 3024319 (S.D.N.Y. August 03, 2010), the court affirmed an arbitration award in favor of Shanghai Viquest Precesion Industries Co., Ltd. (“Viquest”) to recover for unpaid shipments of snowboard bindings made to Burton Corp. (“Burton”) for use in its snowboards and for wrongful termination of the sales agreement. The agreement permitted Burton to terminate if Viquest’s “financial position pose[d] a risk to Burton's business.” Additionally, the agreement provided that Viquest would, upon request, return Burton’s molds upon termination for any reason. During the term of the agreement and while Burton owed Viquest $1.8 million for unpaid shipments, Burton terminated, claiming financial concerns, and requested return of the molds.
When Viquest did not return the molds, Burton had to replace the molds and filed an arbitration to recover its cost of replacement as the agreement provided for arbitration of disputes. Viquest counterclaimed for its lost profits due to the early termination. The arbitration panel concluded that Burton could only terminate under the financial clause if it reasonably believed that Viquest’s financial position threatened its prospects, which Burton did not prove. Accordingly, the arbitration panel awarded Viquest its lost profits for the early termination and denied Burton’s request for the cost of replacing the molds as Burton was not itself in conformance with the agreement and owed Viquest substantial sums.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Burton’s request to vacate the arbitration award against it, confirming the award in full. The court treated the reasonableness as derived from the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, citing to the U.C.C. section 1-304 obligation of good faith contained in every contract. The court observed that the obligation of good faith required Burton to have a reasonable basis for terminating the agreement. Moreover, Burton’s failure to pay Viquest for outstanding invoices put pressure on Viquest’s financial condition.
- JSM
In Burton Corp. v. Shanghai Viquest Precesion Industries Co., Ltd., No. 10 Civ. 3163(DLC), 2010 WL 3024319 (S.D.N.Y. August 03, 2010), the court affirmed an arbitration award in favor of Shanghai Viquest Precesion Industries Co., Ltd. (“Viquest”) to recover for unpaid shipments of snowboard bindings made to Burton Corp. (“Burton”) for use in its snowboards and for wrongful termination of the sales agreement. The agreement permitted Burton to terminate if Viquest’s “financial position pose[d] a risk to Burton's business.” Additionally, the agreement provided that Viquest would, upon request, return Burton’s molds upon termination for any reason. During the term of the agreement and while Burton owed Viquest $1.8 million for unpaid shipments, Burton terminated, claiming financial concerns, and requested return of the molds.
When Viquest did not return the molds, Burton had to replace the molds and filed an arbitration to recover its cost of replacement as the agreement provided for arbitration of disputes. Viquest counterclaimed for its lost profits due to the early termination. The arbitration panel concluded that Burton could only terminate under the financial clause if it reasonably believed that Viquest’s financial position threatened its prospects, which Burton did not prove. Accordingly, the arbitration panel awarded Viquest its lost profits for the early termination and denied Burton’s request for the cost of replacing the molds as Burton was not itself in conformance with the agreement and owed Viquest substantial sums.
The District Court for the Southern District of New York denied Burton’s request to vacate the arbitration award against it, confirming the award in full. The court treated the reasonableness as derived from the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, citing to the U.C.C. section 1-304 obligation of good faith contained in every contract. The court observed that the obligation of good faith required Burton to have a reasonable basis for terminating the agreement. Moreover, Burton’s failure to pay Viquest for outstanding invoices put pressure on Viquest’s financial condition.
- JSM
Wednesday, February 9, 2011
The Predominant Purpose Test Still Predominates Mixed Goods/Services Transactions
Here is another little bit from the upcoming Sales Survey in the business lawyer. Here are a couple of nice examples of recent mixed-goods/services transactions under UCC section 2-102. Use of the predominates test has been pretty consistent in cases I've seen of late.In Blesi-Evans Co. v. Western Mechanical Service, Inc., 72 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 115 (W.D.S.D. 2010), the court examined whether a contract for a boiler purchased for installation at the South Dakota School of Mines and Technology (SDSM&T) campus was one for the sale of goods. Western Mechanical Service (Western) had a contract for the replacement of the SDSM&T boiler that required it to pay $500 per day in liquidated damages if the installation was not substantially complete by October 13, 2006. Western ordered the boiler from Blesi-Evans (Blesi), which agreed to also provide start up and training for the boiler. When Blesi failed to deliver the boiler in time to meet the SDSM&T contract, Western installed a temporary boiler. Blesi brought suit for its contract price on the boiler and Western claimed the expense of the temporary boiler. The court correctly ruled that Article 2 governs transactions where goods and services are bundled if the “predominant purpose” of the contract was for the sale of goods and the services are merely incidental. The court noted that Blesi was to provide a boiler, something clearly movable. The court noted that some of the purchase documents failed even to mention the related services and the dispute that actually arose was one related to the provision of the good in a timely manner, not the services.
Similarly in Connie Beale, Inc. v. Plimpton, 2010 WL 398903 (Conn.Super. January 13, 2010), the court considered a claim for breach of an interior decorating contract. Applying the predominant purpose test, the court found a contract for interior design is predominantly one for services, even though the designer would present furniture, upholstery, window coverings, fabrics and flooring to the buyer for consideration. The court noted that “[a] transaction that requires the incorporation of materials does not make it an agreement for a sale . . . .” Moreover, the parties did not label the contract a sale of furnishings, even though decorating services would surely include some goods.
- jsm
Tuesday, February 8, 2011
2-204 Still Requires Contract Basics
It is the time of the year when I am working on the ABA's Sales Survey of Article 2 cases from 2010. So, I'll pass along a few nice ones here. Perhaps some of these will make good examination questions or just good basics. And the lesson of today's 2010 case, yes, an Article 2 contract still requires a basic agreement at least some definite terms.
While much litigation and scholarly attention surrounding contract formation under Article 2 centers on section 2 207, the decision in Teter v. Glass Onion, Inc., 723 F.Supp.2d 1138 (W.D. Mo. 2010) turned on the application of section 2 204. Gary Teter (“Teter”), an artist who paints historic scenes, met with the owners of the Glass Onion, Inc. (“Glass Onion”), the purchaser of a gallery with which Teter had done business in the past to discuss the continuation of the business relationship with the gallery under Glass Onion’s ownership. Thereafter, the parties had several sales transactions for original paintings by Teter where Glass Onion purchased the paintings and posted an image on its website. After some period of time, however, Teter’s agent advised that to continue the relationship, Glass Onion would need to execute a Dealership Agreement.
When Glass Onion did not become an authorized dealer, Teter’s agent requested that Glass Onion remove images from its web site and advertising. When Glass Onion did not remove the images, Teter brought suit against Glass Onion on various claims related to Glass Onion’s use of Teter’s works in its advertising. Glass Onion brought counterclaims on the grounds that Teter breached a contract to sell art to Glass Onion and provide it a geographic exclusivity. The court granted Teter’s motion for summary judgment on Glass Onion’s counterclaims. The court noted that while section 2-204 permits the making of a contract based on conduct of the parties, the basic elements of an agreement must still be present. While the eight purchases of artwork constituted contracts, the alleged ongoing agreement to sell artwork to Glass Onion for resale on the same terms as the predecessor owner of the gallery was too indefinite and lacked consideration to constitute a contract under section 2-204. Accordingly, Teter was under no firm obligation with Glass Onion or the previous gallery owner to continue selling artwork and could stop selling or refuse to sell paintings to the gallery without recourse.
For similar lines of reasoning, see Key Items, Inc. v. Ultima Diamonds, Inc., No. 09 Civ. 3729(HBP), 2010 WL 3291582 (S.D.N.Y. August 17, 2010) (companies related to buyer were not responsible on unpaid contract to which they were not a party); Harman Invs., Ltd. v. Shah Safari, Inc., No. C10-0216RSL, 2010 WL 3522517 (W.D. Wash. September 07, 2010)(financier was not party to contract for purchase of goods and not liable for non-payment thereon).
- JSM
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